There have been no arrests or charges for cybercrime events in the UK for almost two months. I do not believe that this apparent lack of law enforcement action is the result of any recent reduction in cybercrime. Instead, I predict that a multitude of coordinated arrests is being planned, to take place nationally over a short period of time.
My observations arise from the Cambridge Computer Crime Database (CCCD), which I have been maintaining for some time now. The database contains over 400 entries dating back to January 2010, detailing arrests, charges, and prosecutions for computer crime in the UK.
Since the beginning of 2016, there have been no arrests or charges for incidents that fit within the scope of the CCCD that I have picked up using various public source data collection methods. The last arrest was in mid-December, when a male was arrested on suspicion of offences under sections 1 and 2 of the Computer Misuse Act. Press coverage of this arrest linked it to the VTech data breach.
A coordinated ‘cyber crime strike week’ took place in early March 2015. In just one week, 57 suspects were arrested for a range of offences, including denial of service attacks, cyber-enabled fraud, network intrusion and data theft, and malware development.
Coordinated law enforcement action to address particular crime problems is not uncommon. A large number of arrests is ‘newsworthy’, capturing national headlines and sending the message that law enforcement take these matters seriously and wrongdoers will be caught. What is less clear is whether one week of news coverage would have a greater effect than 52 weeks of more sustained levels of arrest.
Furthermore, many of the outcomes of the 2015 arrests are unknown (possibly indicating no further action has been taken), or pending. This indicates that large numbers of simultaneous arrests may place pressure on the rest of the criminal justice system, particularly for offences with complex evidentiary requirements.
This morning at 0930 the Joint Committee on the IP Bill is launching its report. As one of the witnesses who appeared before it, I got an embargoed copy yesterday.
The report s deeply disappointing; even that of the Intelligence and Security Committee (whom we tended to dismiss as government catspaws) is more vigorous. The MPs and peers on the Joint Committee have given the spooks all they wanted, while recommending tweaks and polishes here and there to some of the more obvious hooks and sharp edges.
The committee supports comms data retention, despite acknowledging that multiple courts have found this contrary to EU and human-rights law, and the fact that there are cases in the pipeline. It supports extending retention from big telcos offering a public service to private operators and even coffee shops. It support greatly extending comms data to ICRs; although it does call for more clarity on the definition, it give the Home Office lots of wriggle room by saying that a clear definition is hard if you want to catch all the things that bad people might do in the future. (Presumably a coffee shop served with an ICR order will have no choice but to install a government-approved black box. or just pipe everything to Cheltenham.) It welcomes the government decision to build and operate a request filter – essentially the comms database for which the Home Office has been trying to get parliamentary approval since the days of Jacqui Smith (and which Snowden told us they just built anyway). It comes up with the rather startling justification that this will help privacy as the police may have access to less stuff (though of course the spooks, including our 5eyes partners and others, will have more). It wants end-to-end encrypted stuff to be made available unless it’s “not practicable to do so”, which presumably means that the Home Secretary can order Apple to add her public key quietly to your keyring to get at your Facetime video chats. That has been a key goal of the FBI in Crypto War 2; a Home Office witness openly acknowledged it.
The comparison with the USA is stark. There, all three branches of government realised they’d gone too far after Snowden. President Obama set up the NSA review group, and implemented most of its recommendations by executive order; the judiciary made changes to the procedures of the FISA Court; and Congress failed to renew the data retention provisions in the Patriot Act (aided by the judiciary). Yet here in Britain the response is just to take Henry VIII powers to legalise all the illegal things that GCHQ had been up to, and hope that the European courts won’t strike the law down yet again.
People concerned for freedom and privacy will just have to hope the contrary. The net effect of the minor amendments proposed by the joint committee will be to make it even harder to get any meaningful amendments as the Bill makes its way through Parliament, and we’ll end up having to rely on the European courts to trim it back.
For more, see Scrambling for Safety, a conference we held last month in London on the bill and whose video is now online, and last week’s Cambridge symposium for a more detailed analysis.
I’m in a symposium at Churchill College on the Investigatory Powers Bill. It’s organised by John Naughton and I’ll be speaking later on equipment interference, a topic on which I wrote an expert report for the recent IP Tribunal case brought by Privacy International. Meanwhile I’ll try to liveblog the event in followups to this post.
Your browser contains a few hundred root certificates. Many of them were put there by governments; two (Verisign and Comodo) are there because so many merchants trust them that they’ve become ‘too big to fail’. This is a bit like where people buy the platform with the most software – a pattern of behaviour that let IBM and then Microsoft dominate our industry in turn. But this is not how trust should work; it leads to many failures, some of them invisible.
What’s missing is a mechanism where trust derives from users, rather than from vendors, merchants or states. After all, the power of a religion stems from the people who believe in it, not from the government. Entities with godlike powers that are foisted on us by others and can work silently against us are not gods, but demons. What can we do to exorcise them?
Do You Believe in Tinker Bell? The Social Externalities of Trust explores how we can crowdsource trust. Tor bridges help censorship victims access the Internet freely, and there are not enough of them. We want to motivate lots of people to provide them, and the best providers are simply those who help the most victims. So trust should flow from the support of the users, and it should be hard for powerful third parties to pervert. Perhaps a useful mascot is Tinker Bell, the fairy in Peter Pan, whose power waxes and wanes with the number of children who believe in her.
We are looking for three more people to join the Cambridge security group. Two job adverts, intended for postgrads or postdocs, are already out now. A third one, specifically aimed at a final year undergraduate or master student, strong on programming but with no significant work experience, is currently making its way through the HR pipeline and should appear soon. Please pass this on to anyone potentially interested.
With the Pico project (see website
for videos, papers and more) we wish to liberate humanity from the usability and security problems of passwords. We are looking for a UX designer to help us in our quest to produce a user-centred, effective and pleasant to use solution and for two software engineers with a security mindset to help us build it and make it robust against attacks. Would you like to join us and contribute to eliminating the annoyance and frustration of passwords from the daily experience of billions of computer users?
- User experience (UX) designer
Research Associate or Assistant (with/without PhD)
Start date: ASAP
Details and link to application form: http://www.jobs.cam.ac.uk/job/9244/
- Senior software engineer / software engineer
Research Associate or Assistant (with/without PhD)
Start date: ASAP
Details and link to application form: http://www.jobs.cam.ac.uk/job/9245/
- Software engineer
Research assistant (having just completed a bachelor or master in CS/EE)
Start date: June 2016
Watch this space: the ad should go live within a week or so
Today I’m at the tenth Scrambling for Safety which is being held at Kings College London. Sorry, all the tickets are sold out, but there is a video feed available from the Open Rights Group website.
This year, I’m on the PC for LASER 2016: the Oakland-attached workshop on Learning from Authoritative Security Experiment Results. The LASER 2016 CFP is now online, with a focus on methodologies for computer security experimentation, new experimental approaches, unexpected results or failed experiments, and, more generally, consideration of how to standardise scientific approaches to security research. Please consider submitting a paper — especially if you are pushing the boundaries on how we conduct experiments in the field of computer-security research!
The deadline is 29 January 2016. A limited number of student scholarships will be available to attend.
Continue reading CFP: Learning from Authoritative Security Experiment Results (LASER 2016)
A very exciting Passwords 2015 is being hosted at the Computer Laboratory from 7 to 9 December. A unique conference that brings together the world’s top password hackers and academics. It is being liveblogged by the participants on Twitter with the hashtag #passwords15. A live feed is available on the Passwords 2015 page.
This afternoon at 4.30 I have been invited to give evidence in Parliament to the Joint Select Committee on the Investigatory Powers Bill.
This follows evidence I gave on the technical aspects of the bill to the Science and Technology Committee on November 10th; see video and documents. Of particular interest may be comments by my Cambridge colleague Richard Clayton; an analysis by my UCL colleague George Danezis; the ORG wiki; and finally the text of the bill itself.
While the USA has reacted to the Snowden revelations by restraining the NSA in various ways, the UK reaction appears to be the opposite. Do we really want to follow countries like China, Russia and Kazakhstan, and take the risk that we’ll tip countries like Brazil and India into following our lead? If the Internet fragments into national islands, that will not only do grave harm to the world economy, but make life a lot harder for GCHQ too.
We know more and more about the financial cost of cybercrime, but there has been very little work on its emotional cost. David Modic and I decided to investigate. We wanted to empirically test whether there are emotional repercussions to becoming a victim of fraud (Yes, there are). We wanted to compare emotional and financial impact across different categories of fraud and establish a ranking list (And we did). An interesting, although not surprising, finding was that in every tested category the victim’s perception of emotional impact outweighed the reported financial loss.
A victim may think that they will still be able to recover their money, if not their pride. That really depends on what type of fraud they facilitated. If it is auction fraud, then their chances of recovery are comparatively higher than in bank fraud – we found that 26% of our sample would attempt to recover funds lost in a fraudulent auction and approximately half of them were reimbursed (look at this presentation). There is considerable evidence that banks are not very likely to believe someone claiming to be a victim of, say, identity theft and by extension bank fraud. Thus, when someone ends up out of pocket, they will likely also go through a process of secondary victimisation where they will be told they broke some small-print rule like having the same pin for two of their bank cards or not using the bank’s approved anti-virus software, and are thus not eligible for any refund and it is all their own fault, really.
You can find the article here or here. (It was published in IEEE Security & Privacy.)
This paper complements and extends our earlier work on the costs of cybercrime, where we show that the broader economic costs to society of cybercrime – such as loss of confidence in online shopping and banking – also greatly exceed the amounts that cybercriminals actually manage to steal.