Category Archives: Academic papers

How to vote anonymously under ubiquitous surveillance

In 2006, the Chancellor proposed to invade an enemy planet, but his motion was anonymously vetoed. Three years on, he still cannot find out who did it.

This time, the Chancellor is seeking re-election in the Galactic Senate. Some delegates don’t want to vote for him, but worry about his revenge. How to arrange an election such that the voter’s privacy will be best protected?

The environment is extremely adverse. Surveillance is everywhere. Anything you say will be recorded and traceable to you. All communication is essentially public. In addition, you have no one to trust but yourself.

It may seem mind-boggling that this problem is solvable in the first place. With cryptography, anything is possible. In a forthcoming paper to be published by IET Information Security, we (joint work with Peter Ryan and Piotr Zielinski) described a decentralized voting protocol called “Open Vote Network”.

In the Open Vote Network protocol, all communication data is open, and publicly verifiable. The protocol provides the maximum protection of the voter’s privacy; only a full collusion can break the privacy. In addition, the protocol is exceptionally efficient. It compares favorably to past solutions in terms of the round efficiency, computation load and bandwidth usage, and has been close to the best possible in each of these aspects.

With the same security properties, it seems unlikely to have a decentralized voting scheme that is significantly more efficient than ours. However, in cryptography, nothing is ever optimal, so we keep this question open.

A preprint of the paper is available here, and the slides here.

The Real Hustle and the psychology of scam victims

This, which started as a contribution to Ross’s Security and Psychology initiative, is probably my most entertaining piece of research this year and it’s certainly getting its bit of attention.

I’ve been a great fan of The Real Hustle since 2006, which I recommend to anyone with an interest in security, and it has been good fun to work with the TV show’s coauthor Paul Wilson on this paper. We analyze the scams reproduced in the show, we extract general principles from them that describe typical behavioural patterns exploited by hustlers and then we show how an awareness of these principles can also strengthen systems security.

In a few months I have given versions of this talk around the world: Boston, London, Athens, London, Cambridge, Munich—to the security and psychology crowd, to computer researchers, to professional programmers—and it never failed to attract interest. This is what Yahoo’s Chris Heilmann wrote in his blog when I gave the talk at StackOverflow to an audience of 250 programmers:

The other talk I was able to attend was Frank Stajano, a resident lecturer and security expert (and mighty sword-bearer). His talk revolved around application security but instead of doing the classic “prevent yourself from XSS/SQL injection/CSRF” spiel, Frank took a different route. BBC TV in the UK has a program called The Real Hustle which shows how people are scammed by tricksters and gamblers and the psychology behind these successful scams. Despite the abysmal Guy Ritchie style presentation of the show, it is full of great information: Frank and a colleague conducted a detailed research and analysis of all the attacks and the reasons why they work. The paper on the research is available: Seven principles for systems security (PDF). A thoroughly entertaining and fascinating presentation and a great example of how security can be explained without sounding condescending or drowning the audience in jargon. I really hope that there is a recording of the talk.

I´m giving the talk again at the Computer Laboratory on Tuesday 17 November in the Security Seminars series. The full write-up is available for download as a tech report.

Interview with Steven Murdoch on Finextra

Today, Finextra (a financial technology news website), has published a video interview with me, discussing my research on banks using card readers for online banking, which was recently featured on TV.

In this interview, I discuss some of the more technical aspects of the attacks on card readers, including the one demonstrated on TV (which requires compromising a Chip & PIN terminal), as well as others which instead require that the victim’s PC be compromised, but which can be carried out on a larger scale.

I also compare the approaches taken by the banking community to protocol design, with that of the Internet community. Financial organizations typically develop protocols internally, and so are subject to public scrutiny late in deployment, if at all. This is in contrast with Internet protocols which are commonly first discussed within industry and academia, then the specification is made public, and only then is it implemented. As a consequence, vulnerabilities in banking security systems are often more expensive to fix.

Also, I discuss some of the non-technical design decisions involved in the deployment of security technology. Specifically, their design needs to take into account risk analysis, psychology and usability, not just cryptography. Organizational structures also need to incentivize security; groups who design security mechanisms should be responsible for failure. Organizational structures should also discourage knowledge of security failings from being hidden from management. If necessary a separate penetration testing team should report directly to board level.

Finally I mention one good design principle for security protocols: “make everything as simple as possible, but not simpler”.

The video (7 minutes) can be found below, and is also on the Finextra website.

TV coverage of online banking card-reader vulnerabilities

This evening (Monday 26th October 2009, at 19:30 UTC), BBC Inside Out will show Saar Drimer and I demonstrating how the use of smart card readers, being issued in the UK to authenticate online banking transactions, can be circumvented. The programme will be broadcast on BBC One, but only in the East of England and Cambridgeshire, however it should also be available on iPlayer.

In this programme, we demonstrate how a tampered Chip & PIN terminal could collect an authentication code for Barclays online banking, while a customer thinks they are buying a sandwich. The criminal could then, at their leisure, use this code and the customer’s membership number to fraudulently transfer up to £10,000.

Similar attacks are possible against all other banks which use the card readers (known as CAP devices) for online banking. We think that this type of scenario is particularly practical in targeted attacks, and circumvents any anti-malware protection, but criminals have already been seen using banking trojans to attack CAP on a wide scale.

Further information can be found on the BBC online feature, and our research summary. We have also published an academic paper on the topic, which was presented at Financial Cryptography 2009.

Update (2009-10-27): The full programme is now on BBC iPlayer for the next 6 days, and the segment can also be found on YouTube.

BBC Inside Out, Monday 26th October 2009, 19:30, BBC One (East)

Security psychology

I have put together a web page on psychology and security. There is a fascinating interplay between these two subjects, and their intersection is now emerging as a new research discipline, encompassing deception, risk perception, security usability and a number of other important topics. I hope that the new web page will be as useful in spreading the word as my security economics page has been in that field.

Economics of peer-to-peer systems

A new paper, Olson’s Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Analysis of File-Sharing Behaviour in P2P Communities, finds a positive correlation between the size of a BitTorrent file-sharing community and the amount of content shared, despite a reduced individual propensity to share in larger groups, and deduces from this that file-sharing communities provide a pure (non-rival) public good. Forcing users to upload results in a smaller catalogue; but private networks provide both more and better content, as do networks aimed at specialised communities.

George Danezis and I produced a theoretical model of this five years ago in The Economics of Censorship Resistance. It’s nice to see that the data, now collected, bear us out

How much did shutting down McColo help?

On 11 November 2008 McColo, a Californian server hosting company, was disconnected from the Internet. This took the controllers for 6 major botnets offline. It has been widely reported that email spam volumes were markedly reduced for some time thereafter. But did disconnecting McColo only get rid of “easy to block” spam?

In a paper presented this week at the Sixth Conference on Email and Antispam (CEAS) I examined email traffic data for for the incoming email to a UK ISP to see what effect the disconnection had.
Continue reading How much did shutting down McColo help?

The Economics of Privacy in Social Networks

We often think of social networking to Facebook, MySpace, and the also-rans, but in reality there are there are tons of social networks out there, dozens which have membership in the millions. Around the world it’s quite a competitive market. Sören Preibusch and I decided to study the whole ecosystem to analyse how free-market competition has shaped the privacy practices which I’ve been complaining about. We carefully examined 45 sites, collecting over 250 data points about each sites’ privacy policies, privacy controls, data collection practices, and more. The results were fascinating, as we presented this week at the WEIS conference in London. Our full paper and complete dataset are now available online as well.

We collected a lot of data, and there was a little bit of something for everybody. There was encouraging news for fans of globalisation, as we found the social networking concept popular across many cultures and languages, with the most popular sites being available in over 40 languages. There was an interesting finding from a business perspective that photo-sharing may be the killer application for social networks, as this features was promoted far more often than sharing videos, blogging, or playing games. Unfortunately the news was mostly negative from a privacy standpoint. We found some predictable but still surprising problems. Too much unnecessary data is collected by most sites, 90% requiring a full-name and DOB. Security practices are dreadful: no sites employed phishing countermeasures, and 80% of sites failed to protect password entry using TLS. Privacy policies were obfuscated and confusing, and almost half failed basic accessibility tests. Privacy controls were confusing and overwhelming, and profiles were almost universally left open by default.

The most interesting story we found though was how sites consistently hid any mention of privacy, until we visited the privacy policies where they provided paid privacy seals and strong reassurances about how important privacy is. We developed a novel economic explanation for this: sites appear to craft two different messages for two different populations. Most users care about privacy about privacy but don’t think about it in day-to-day life. Sites take care to avoid mentioning privacy to them, because even mentioning privacy positively will cause them to be more cautious about sharing data. This phenomenon is known as “privacy salience” and it makes sites tread very carefully around privacy, because users must be comfortable sharing data for the site to be fun. Instead of mentioning privacy, new users are shown a huge sample of other users posting fun pictures, which encourages them to  share as well. For privacy fundamentalists who go looking for privacy by reading the privacy policy, though, it is important to drum up privacy re-assurance.

The privacy fundamentalists of the world may be positively influencing privacy on major sites through their pressure. Indeed, the bigger, older, and more popular sites we studied had better privacy practices overall. But the desire to limit privacy salience is also a major problem because it prevents sites from providing clear information about their privacy practices. Most users therefore can’t tell what they’re getting in to, resulting in the predominance of poor-practices in this “privacy jungle.”

Location privacy

I was recently asked for a brief (4-page) invited paper for a forthcoming special issue of the ACM SIGSPATIAL on privacy and security of location-based systems, so I wrote Foot-driven computing: our first glimpse of location privacy issues.

In 1989 at ORL we developed the Active Badge, the first indoor location system: an infrared transmitter worn by personnel that allowed you to tell which room the wearer was in. Every press and TV reporter who visited our lab worried about the intrusiveness of this technology; yet, today, all those people happily carry mobile phones through which they can be tracked anywhere they go. The significance of the Active Badge project was to give us a head start of a few years during which to think about location privacy before it affected hundreds of millions of people. (There is more on our early ubiquitous computing work at ORL in this free excerpt from my book.)
The ORL Active Badge

Location privacy is a hard problem to solve, first because ordinary people don’t seem to actually care, and second because there is a misalignment of incentives: those who could do the most to address the problem are the least affected and the least concerned about it. But we have a responsibility to address it, in the same way that designers of new vehicles have a responsibility to address the pollution and energy consumption issue.