We have just re-advertised a “post-doc” position in the Cambridge Cybercrime Centre: https://www.cambridgecybercrime.uk. The vacancy arises because Daniel is off to become a Chancellor’s Fellow at Strathclyde), the re-advertisement is because of a technical flaw in the previous advertising process (which is now addressed).
We are looking for an enthusiastic researcher to join us to work on our datasets of cybercrime activity, collecting new types of data, maintaining existing datasets and doing innovative research using our data. The person we appoint will define their own goals and objectives and pursue them independently, or as part of a team.
An ideal candidate would identify cybercrime datasets that can be collected, build the collection systems and then do cutting edge research on this data — whilst encouraging other academics to take our data and make their own contributions to the field.
We are not necessarily looking for existing experience in researching cybercrime, although this would be a bonus. However, we are looking for strong programming skills — and experience with scripting languages and databases would be much preferred. Good knowledge of English and communication skills are important.
Please follow this link to the advert to read the formal advertisement for the details about exactly who and what we’re looking for and how to apply — and please pay attention to our request that in the covering letter you create as part of the application you should explain which particular aspects of cybercrime research are of particular interest to you.
I’m at the fourth Cambridge Cybercrime Conference, which I will try to liveblog in followups to this post.
Security updates are an important mechanism for protecting users and their devices from attack, and therefore it’s important vendors produce security updates, and that users apply them. Producing security updates is particularly difficult when more than one vendor needs to make changes in order to secure a system.
When we published our paper in 2015, we predicted that this vulnerability would not be patched on 95% of devices in the Android ecosystem until January 2018 (plus or minus a standard deviation of 1.23 years). Since this date has now passed, we decided to check whether our prediction was correct.
To perform our analysis we used data on deployed API versions taken from (almost) monthly snapshots of Google’s Android Distribution Dashboard which we have been tracking. The good news is that we found the operating system update requirements crossed the 95% threshold in May 2017, seven months earlier than our best estimate, and within one standard deviation of our prediction. The most recent data for May 2019 shows deployment has reached 98.2% of devices in use. Nevertheless, fixing this aspect of the vulnerability took well over 4 years to reach 95% of devices.
Google delivered a further fix in Android 4.4.3 that blocked access to the
Our work is not done however, and we are still looking into the security of mobile devices. This summer we are extending the work from our other 2015 paper Security Metrics for the Android Ecosystem where we analysed the composition of Android vulnerabilities. Last time we used distributions of deployed Android versions on devices from Device Analyzer (an Android measurement app we deployed to Google Play), the device management system of a FTSE 100 company, and User-Agent string data from an ISP in Rwanda. If you might be able to share similar data with us to support our latest research work then please get in touch: email@example.com.