The role of software engineering in electronic elections

Many designs for trustworthy electronic elections use cryptography to assure participants that the result is accurate. However, it is a system’s software engineering that ensures a result is declared at all. Both good software engineering and cryptography are thus necessary, but so far cryptography has drawn more attention. In fact, the software engineering aspects could … Continue reading The role of software engineering in electronic elections

23rd Chaos Communication Congress

The 23rd Chaos Communication Congress will be held later this month in Berlin, Germany on 27–30 December. I will be attending to give a talk on Hot or Not: Revealing Hidden Services by their Clock Skew. Another contributor to this blog, George Danezis, will be talking on An Introduction to Traffic Analysis. This will be … Continue reading 23rd Chaos Communication Congress

Protecting software distribution with a cryptographic build process

At the rump session of PET 2006 I presented a simple idea on how to defend against a targeted attacks on software distribution. There were some misunderstandings after my 5 minute description, so I thought it would help to put the idea down in writing and I also hope to attract more discussion and a … Continue reading Protecting software distribution with a cryptographic build process

TR-666: A pact with the Devil

Today, Tuesday 6/6/6, Mike Bond and George Danezis published our department’s 666-th technical report titled “A pact with the Devil”. In this devious research paper, they explore the risks of a whole new generation of malware that exploits not only computer users’ inexperience to propagate, but also their greed, malice and short-sightedness.

Towards a market price for insecurity

There’s been a certain amount of research into the value of security holes in the past few years (for a starter bibliography see the “Economics of vulnerabilities” section on Ross Anderson’s “Economics and Security Resource Page”). Both TippingPoint and iDefense who currently run vulnerability markets for zero day exploits are somewhat coy about saying what … Continue reading Towards a market price for insecurity