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	<title>Comments on: How online card security fails</title>
	<atom:link href="http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2010/01/26/how-online-card-security-fails/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2010/01/26/how-online-card-security-fails/</link>
	<description>Security Research, Computer Laboratory, University of Cambridge</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Fri, 27 Aug 2010 15:36:41 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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		<title>By: Ross Anderson</title>
		<link>http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2010/01/26/how-online-card-security-fails/comment-page-1/#comment-66679</link>
		<dc:creator>Ross Anderson</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 16 Jul 2010 19:07:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/?p=1614#comment-66679</guid>
		<description>The Zeus botnet is now (July 2010) doing active middleperson attacks on 3Dsecure - see stories from &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/07/13/zeus_goes_local/&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;The Register&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/view/10992/financial-hackers-attacking-visamastercard-users-with-fake-3d-secure-logins/&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;Infosecurity Magazine&lt;/a&gt;,  &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.scmagazineus.com/zeus-now-spoofing-visa-mastercard-programs/article/174635/&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;SC Magazine&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href=&quot;http://darkreading.com/security/vulnerabilities/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=225800175&amp;subSection=Vulnerabilities+and+threats&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;Darkreading&lt;/a&gt;.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Zeus botnet is now (July 2010) doing active middleperson attacks on 3Dsecure &#8211; see stories from <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/07/13/zeus_goes_local/" rel="nofollow">The Register</a>, <a href="http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/view/10992/financial-hackers-attacking-visamastercard-users-with-fake-3d-secure-logins/" rel="nofollow">Infosecurity Magazine</a>,  <a href="http://www.scmagazineus.com/zeus-now-spoofing-visa-mastercard-programs/article/174635/" rel="nofollow">SC Magazine</a> and <a href="http://darkreading.com/security/vulnerabilities/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=225800175&#038;subSection=Vulnerabilities+and+threats" rel="nofollow">Darkreading</a>.</p>
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		<title>By: Eyal</title>
		<link>http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2010/01/26/how-online-card-security-fails/comment-page-1/#comment-64367</link>
		<dc:creator>Eyal</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 28 Jun 2010 09:34:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/?p=1614#comment-64367</guid>
		<description>I have been asked by different sites to use 3d secure and bypassed it during the process. If you try several times back and forth at the end somehow the process &quot;forgets&quot; you were supposed to register to it.....

BTW what security gives you any service where you register to it online during the payment process!!!! if you hacked the real owner info you will use it anyway to register and pass the process with no problems....</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I have been asked by different sites to use 3d secure and bypassed it during the process. If you try several times back and forth at the end somehow the process &#8220;forgets&#8221; you were supposed to register to it&#8230;..</p>
<p>BTW what security gives you any service where you register to it online during the payment process!!!! if you hacked the real owner info you will use it anyway to register and pass the process with no problems&#8230;.</p>
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		<title>By: Martin J</title>
		<link>http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2010/01/26/how-online-card-security-fails/comment-page-1/#comment-63573</link>
		<dc:creator>Martin J</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 19 Jun 2010 09:32:17 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/?p=1614#comment-63573</guid>
		<description>Does anyone know of a UK card issuer that still lets its customers avoid using the 3D Secure system?

I recently asked First Direct, but was told that I couldn&#039;t disable Verified by Visa on my account.  I&#039;ve avoided registering so far, but it&#039;s getting harder and harder to buy things online without registering.  There&#039;s a bullying message telling you that future online transactions may be refused if you decline three times.

On a related topic, has anyone tried using a card for face-to-face transactions with the CVV number obscured on the back of the card?  It strikes me that the CVV number should not appear on the card, as it&#039;s only necessary for cardholder-not-present transactions.  But sometimes (e.g. in hotels) the CVV gets written down (even though it&#039;s against the rules): I guess hotel staff must be tempted to take the path of least resistance, because the customer will complain if they pre-authorise a suitably large amount at check-in, even though that&#039;s the correct thing to do.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Does anyone know of a UK card issuer that still lets its customers avoid using the 3D Secure system?</p>
<p>I recently asked First Direct, but was told that I couldn&#8217;t disable Verified by Visa on my account.  I&#8217;ve avoided registering so far, but it&#8217;s getting harder and harder to buy things online without registering.  There&#8217;s a bullying message telling you that future online transactions may be refused if you decline three times.</p>
<p>On a related topic, has anyone tried using a card for face-to-face transactions with the CVV number obscured on the back of the card?  It strikes me that the CVV number should not appear on the card, as it&#8217;s only necessary for cardholder-not-present transactions.  But sometimes (e.g. in hotels) the CVV gets written down (even though it&#8217;s against the rules): I guess hotel staff must be tempted to take the path of least resistance, because the customer will complain if they pre-authorise a suitably large amount at check-in, even though that&#8217;s the correct thing to do.</p>
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		<title>By: James Lin</title>
		<link>http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2010/01/26/how-online-card-security-fails/comment-page-1/#comment-53312</link>
		<dc:creator>James Lin</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 26 Mar 2010 16:10:04 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/?p=1614#comment-53312</guid>
		<description>Hi, 
Can you take a look at this solution and give me your feedback? 

&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.paymentseal.com&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;http://www.paymentseal.com&lt;/a&gt;

Although it still has the pop-up involved, it is easy to implement and it does not require additional communication with issuing bank entity.  3D secure is designed to benefit the merchants while the PaymentSeal solution I&#039;m proposing addresses the shopper&#039;s concerns.

p.s. The demo sites are not SSL secured, but in an actual implementation, there will be SSL.

Your time and effort is much appreciated. J.L.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hi,<br />
Can you take a look at this solution and give me your feedback? </p>
<p><a href="http://www.paymentseal.com" rel="nofollow">http://www.paymentseal.com</a></p>
<p>Although it still has the pop-up involved, it is easy to implement and it does not require additional communication with issuing bank entity.  3D secure is designed to benefit the merchants while the PaymentSeal solution I&#8217;m proposing addresses the shopper&#8217;s concerns.</p>
<p>p.s. The demo sites are not SSL secured, but in an actual implementation, there will be SSL.</p>
<p>Your time and effort is much appreciated. J.L.</p>
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		<title>By: Steve Parker</title>
		<link>http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2010/01/26/how-online-card-security-fails/comment-page-1/#comment-50680</link>
		<dc:creator>Steve Parker</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 06 Mar 2010 02:20:09 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/?p=1614#comment-50680</guid>
		<description>http://thedailywtf.com/Articles/Verified-By-Fail.aspx
- specifically: http://img.thedailywtf.com/images/201002/errord/verified_by_fail.png  seems to sum it up</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://thedailywtf.com/Articles/Verified-By-Fail.aspx" rel="nofollow">http://thedailywtf.com/Articles/Verified-By-Fail.aspx</a><br />
- specifically: <a href="http://img.thedailywtf.com/images/201002/errord/verified_by_fail.png" rel="nofollow">http://img.thedailywtf.com/images/201002/errord/verified_by_fail.png</a>  seems to sum it up</p>
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		<title>By: Carlisle</title>
		<link>http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2010/01/26/how-online-card-security-fails/comment-page-1/#comment-48433</link>
		<dc:creator>Carlisle</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 16 Feb 2010 00:06:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/?p=1614#comment-48433</guid>
		<description>@Clive Robinson:
http://www.tescocorporate.com/plc/ir/corpgorv/boardcomposition/</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@Clive Robinson:<br />
<a href="http://www.tescocorporate.com/plc/ir/corpgorv/boardcomposition/" rel="nofollow">http://www.tescocorporate.com/plc/ir/corpgorv/boardcomposition/</a></p>
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		<title>By: Clive Robinson</title>
		<link>http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2010/01/26/how-online-card-security-fails/comment-page-1/#comment-47480</link>
		<dc:creator>Clive Robinson</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 06 Feb 2010 11:00:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/?p=1614#comment-47480</guid>
		<description>Well TESCO customer support is rolling out the line on VbV that &quot;they have no choice it is the card issuer who says it has to be used&quot; (which is not true)

After explaining this to various people on their&quot;customer support this is not the case.

They refused to pass on the call to somebody more senior and refused to hand over their own identifing details.

Finaly after more preasure they handed over the following address for written complaints,

New Tesco House,
Delamare Road,
Cheshunt,
Herts,
EN8 9SL

But the customer support droid refused to give a name or department it should be marked for.

So TESCO&#039;s customer droids are breaking various rules etc.

So does anybody know the name and correct address of a director level person to whom a formal complaint can be sent?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Well TESCO customer support is rolling out the line on VbV that &#8220;they have no choice it is the card issuer who says it has to be used&#8221; (which is not true)</p>
<p>After explaining this to various people on their&#8221;customer support this is not the case.</p>
<p>They refused to pass on the call to somebody more senior and refused to hand over their own identifing details.</p>
<p>Finaly after more preasure they handed over the following address for written complaints,</p>
<p>New Tesco House,<br />
Delamare Road,<br />
Cheshunt,<br />
Herts,<br />
EN8 9SL</p>
<p>But the customer support droid refused to give a name or department it should be marked for.</p>
<p>So TESCO&#8217;s customer droids are breaking various rules etc.</p>
<p>So does anybody know the name and correct address of a director level person to whom a formal complaint can be sent?</p>
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		<title>By: Mike Bond</title>
		<link>http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2010/01/26/how-online-card-security-fails/comment-page-1/#comment-47021</link>
		<dc:creator>Mike Bond</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 02 Feb 2010 22:32:22 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/?p=1614#comment-47021</guid>
		<description>I think we need some new words. Theres been discussion as to what to call the protocol, what the name of the bit that might be bad should be, if the deployed system is a composite of protocols/implementations. The phrase I like is &quot;protocol framework&quot;.

Is the protocol within a protocol just called an &quot;implementation&quot;, or is the implementation the actual code, and the protocol which it implements a combination of the framework and some proprietary spec document that never sees the light of day? (2 marks)

EMV and 3DS appear to be similar animals: protocol frameworks. They specify the way things work -- in part -- and then there is freedom to do as you wish within the framework, including getting it right, fixing stuff up, pushing other protocols through it, or shooting yourself in the foot.

Now, in the case of banking, if an issuing bank acts like a muppet, and the framework permits it, is the framework broken? (5 marks)

What about if the issuing bank is clueful -- or even rather smart -- but there is a shortcoming in the framework that means they cant actually make the cool extension or feature they want without breaking the framework? (10 marks)

So the fact of the matter is that protocol frameworks are partly, but not totally responsible for the quality of the space of possible implementations that lie within them.

3DS has to take a bit of rap for what issuers feed through it, as does EMV. And dont even get me started on PKCS#11...

Answers on the back of a postcard, please.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I think we need some new words. Theres been discussion as to what to call the protocol, what the name of the bit that might be bad should be, if the deployed system is a composite of protocols/implementations. The phrase I like is &#8220;protocol framework&#8221;.</p>
<p>Is the protocol within a protocol just called an &#8220;implementation&#8221;, or is the implementation the actual code, and the protocol which it implements a combination of the framework and some proprietary spec document that never sees the light of day? (2 marks)</p>
<p>EMV and 3DS appear to be similar animals: protocol frameworks. They specify the way things work &#8212; in part &#8212; and then there is freedom to do as you wish within the framework, including getting it right, fixing stuff up, pushing other protocols through it, or shooting yourself in the foot.</p>
<p>Now, in the case of banking, if an issuing bank acts like a muppet, and the framework permits it, is the framework broken? (5 marks)</p>
<p>What about if the issuing bank is clueful &#8212; or even rather smart &#8212; but there is a shortcoming in the framework that means they cant actually make the cool extension or feature they want without breaking the framework? (10 marks)</p>
<p>So the fact of the matter is that protocol frameworks are partly, but not totally responsible for the quality of the space of possible implementations that lie within them.</p>
<p>3DS has to take a bit of rap for what issuers feed through it, as does EMV. And dont even get me started on PKCS#11&#8230;</p>
<p>Answers on the back of a postcard, please.</p>
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		<title>By: WilliamB</title>
		<link>http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2010/01/26/how-online-card-security-fails/comment-page-1/#comment-47008</link>
		<dc:creator>WilliamB</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 02 Feb 2010 19:14:06 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/?p=1614#comment-47008</guid>
		<description>May I have permission to print out your paper?  I would like to send it to PenFed.  Right now it doesn&#039;t seem to understand why using VbV is such a problem for its customers.

Thank you.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>May I have permission to print out your paper?  I would like to send it to PenFed.  Right now it doesn&#8217;t seem to understand why using VbV is such a problem for its customers.</p>
<p>Thank you.</p>
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		<title>By: WilliamB</title>
		<link>http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2010/01/26/how-online-card-security-fails/comment-page-1/#comment-47007</link>
		<dc:creator>WilliamB</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 02 Feb 2010 19:10:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/?p=1614#comment-47007</guid>
		<description>@Andrew Main (#3):
I&#039;ve had this problem.  I couldn&#039;t use a PenFed cc to purchase online or over the phone from Target.  I did not have the option to not be covered by VbV and Target wouldn&#039;t accept the card without it.  

I didn&#039;t make the purchase and consumed 30 min of Target customer service and days of PenFed VP&#039;s time in the process of trying to buy and learning what the hell was going on.

At no time during the process did anyone tell me that using VbV meant I was liable for any misbillings.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@Andrew Main (#3):<br />
I&#8217;ve had this problem.  I couldn&#8217;t use a PenFed cc to purchase online or over the phone from Target.  I did not have the option to not be covered by VbV and Target wouldn&#8217;t accept the card without it.  </p>
<p>I didn&#8217;t make the purchase and consumed 30 min of Target customer service and days of PenFed VP&#8217;s time in the process of trying to buy and learning what the hell was going on.</p>
<p>At no time during the process did anyone tell me that using VbV meant I was liable for any misbillings.</p>
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