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	<title>Comments on: How hard can it be to measure phishing?</title>
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	<link>http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2010/01/25/how-hard-can-it-be-to-measure-phishing/</link>
	<description>Security Research, Computer Laboratory, University of Cambridge</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Thu, 09 Sep 2010 08:25:42 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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		<title>By: Matthew Pemble</title>
		<link>http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2010/01/25/how-hard-can-it-be-to-measure-phishing/comment-page-1/#comment-46673</link>
		<dc:creator>Matthew Pemble</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 31 Jan 2010 11:50:22 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/?p=1607#comment-46673</guid>
		<description>Sorry, I forgot the Computer Misuse Act s2 offences.  Probably doubling (ish) the total there - but I have no idea how our police / CPS / Procurator Fiscal colleagues count those?  Per access inappropriately gained (so on the order of three per transfer); per account illegally access (so 100); per (bank) website accessed; per bank etc?

I would note that one of the many things that annoyed me about the take-down companies (you know who you are, b@stards!) was that they would count a site / URI as down (and to be paid for) as soon as they couldn&#039;t access it (often because of connectivity issues as it was swamped by the duped - in the days before botnet hosting) and then count it again and again as it popped in and out of reach.

Money lost, money moved, money at risk were all also measured and were important for understanding the actual risk the bank faced.  But the bank&#039;s metrics, important as they are for taking security decisions shouldn&#039;t be the same as society&#039;s metrics (crimes, in this case), which reflect a necessarily different view of what is important.

On the point in your conclusion - it is &quot;2 + multiple&quot; crimes - 1 x TWOC and (1 + multiple) criminal damage.  But don&#039;t worry, he&#039;ll get a conditional discharge or a community service order.  Which, unfortunately, is more than the phishing fraud gang are likely to receive :(</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Sorry, I forgot the Computer Misuse Act s2 offences.  Probably doubling (ish) the total there &#8211; but I have no idea how our police / CPS / Procurator Fiscal colleagues count those?  Per access inappropriately gained (so on the order of three per transfer); per account illegally access (so 100); per (bank) website accessed; per bank etc?</p>
<p>I would note that one of the many things that annoyed me about the take-down companies (you know who you are, b@stards!) was that they would count a site / URI as down (and to be paid for) as soon as they couldn&#8217;t access it (often because of connectivity issues as it was swamped by the duped &#8211; in the days before botnet hosting) and then count it again and again as it popped in and out of reach.</p>
<p>Money lost, money moved, money at risk were all also measured and were important for understanding the actual risk the bank faced.  But the bank&#8217;s metrics, important as they are for taking security decisions shouldn&#8217;t be the same as society&#8217;s metrics (crimes, in this case), which reflect a necessarily different view of what is important.</p>
<p>On the point in your conclusion &#8211; it is &#8220;2 + multiple&#8221; crimes &#8211; 1 x TWOC and (1 + multiple) criminal damage.  But don&#8217;t worry, he&#8217;ll get a conditional discharge or a community service order.  Which, unfortunately, is more than the phishing fraud gang are likely to receive <img src='http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/wp-includes/images/smilies/icon_sad.gif' alt=':(' class='wp-smiley' /> </p>
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		<title>By: Matthew Pemble</title>
		<link>http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2010/01/25/how-hard-can-it-be-to-measure-phishing/comment-page-1/#comment-46669</link>
		<dc:creator>Matthew Pemble</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 31 Jan 2010 11:19:32 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/?p=1607#comment-46669</guid>
		<description>From the ex-banker point of view, we actually used to count, for our own stats, the email waves - it was the easiest thing to do (and the way the attacks were usually detected).  It also meant (very good for your metrics) that you could declare an attack &quot;over&quot; once you had crushed the sites, even though data stolen through them would be (and was :(  ) usable for crimes in the future (which was sometimes irritating because it complicated the post theft analysis.)

On crimes - I&#039;d make that between 112 and 150 (I would count each fraudulent credit card payment and each unauthorised transfer as 1 x theft), but we never considered or relied on any numerical correlation (never mind equality) between &quot;security incident&quot; and actual criminality.

BTW - can I take issue with your &quot;&lt;i&gt;now with impeccable grammar&lt;/i&gt;&quot;?  For anecdote, as opposed to evidence, may I submit the most recent phish from my spam bin?:

&lt;blockquote&gt;Abbey National has changed the Online System Security in the last two days and your account was deactivated for security reasons. We suggest you check your balance
as soon possible, Just in case your savings was affected
please contact us:&lt;/blockquote&gt;</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>From the ex-banker point of view, we actually used to count, for our own stats, the email waves &#8211; it was the easiest thing to do (and the way the attacks were usually detected).  It also meant (very good for your metrics) that you could declare an attack &#8220;over&#8221; once you had crushed the sites, even though data stolen through them would be (and was <img src='http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/wp-includes/images/smilies/icon_sad.gif' alt=':(' class='wp-smiley' />   ) usable for crimes in the future (which was sometimes irritating because it complicated the post theft analysis.)</p>
<p>On crimes &#8211; I&#8217;d make that between 112 and 150 (I would count each fraudulent credit card payment and each unauthorised transfer as 1 x theft), but we never considered or relied on any numerical correlation (never mind equality) between &#8220;security incident&#8221; and actual criminality.</p>
<p>BTW &#8211; can I take issue with your &#8220;<i>now with impeccable grammar</i>&#8220;?  For anecdote, as opposed to evidence, may I submit the most recent phish from my spam bin?:</p>
<blockquote><p>Abbey National has changed the Online System Security in the last two days and your account was deactivated for security reasons. We suggest you check your balance<br />
as soon possible, Just in case your savings was affected<br />
please contact us:</p></blockquote>
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		<title>By: Andy Steingruebl</title>
		<link>http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2010/01/25/how-hard-can-it-be-to-measure-phishing/comment-page-1/#comment-46144</link>
		<dc:creator>Andy Steingruebl</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 26 Jan 2010 17:35:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/?p=1607#comment-46144</guid>
		<description>Thanks for the reply.  It isn&#039;t clear to me though that there is a correlation between phishing mails delivered, and people visiting those sites and giving up their credentials.  If we did have clear evidence of that then phishing mails delivered to the inbox is a reliable predictor of losses.  Without that we&#039;re still a little lost aren&#039;t we?  I haven&#039;t seen any literature demonstrating the correlation above.

Mind you, I think there probably is one, I&#039;m just hoping for more evidence than intuition :)  

And, totally agree on why this is an issue, and why tracking consumer confidence is critically important.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thanks for the reply.  It isn&#8217;t clear to me though that there is a correlation between phishing mails delivered, and people visiting those sites and giving up their credentials.  If we did have clear evidence of that then phishing mails delivered to the inbox is a reliable predictor of losses.  Without that we&#8217;re still a little lost aren&#8217;t we?  I haven&#8217;t seen any literature demonstrating the correlation above.</p>
<p>Mind you, I think there probably is one, I&#8217;m just hoping for more evidence than intuition <img src='http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/wp-includes/images/smilies/icon_smile.gif' alt=':)' class='wp-smiley' />   </p>
<p>And, totally agree on why this is an issue, and why tracking consumer confidence is critically important.</p>
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		<title>By: Richard Clayton</title>
		<link>http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2010/01/25/how-hard-can-it-be-to-measure-phishing/comment-page-1/#comment-46137</link>
		<dc:creator>Richard Clayton</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 26 Jan 2010 15:55:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/?p=1607#comment-46137</guid>
		<description>@Andy
&lt;i&gt;I’m curious why you think that measuring phishing activity, regardless of how measured, tells you anything.&lt;/i&gt;

If the measurement increases then you should be looking for more policing, better security mechanisms, more investment in back-office control systems.

If the measurement decreases then you may be over-investing in preventative measures and looking for ways to make things simpler for customers, with less hoop-jumping when they want to do something unusual with their money.

If phishing measurements decrease but bank losses continue to grow, then you have a key logging problem! and work is needed on countermeasures for that.

&lt;i&gt;It [..] doesn’t really tell us anything about how much we should spend stopping it, what the total economic damage it, etc.&lt;/i&gt;

The real danger for the banks is that people will lose confidence in online banking. That&#039;s potentiall disastrous -- they&#039;d need to repurchase all the trendy wine bars and refill them with all the staff they&#039;ve been downsizing. Serious money, whereas phishing losses are still down in the noise.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@Andy<br />
<i>I’m curious why you think that measuring phishing activity, regardless of how measured, tells you anything.</i></p>
<p>If the measurement increases then you should be looking for more policing, better security mechanisms, more investment in back-office control systems.</p>
<p>If the measurement decreases then you may be over-investing in preventative measures and looking for ways to make things simpler for customers, with less hoop-jumping when they want to do something unusual with their money.</p>
<p>If phishing measurements decrease but bank losses continue to grow, then you have a key logging problem! and work is needed on countermeasures for that.</p>
<p><i>It [..] doesn’t really tell us anything about how much we should spend stopping it, what the total economic damage it, etc.</i></p>
<p>The real danger for the banks is that people will lose confidence in online banking. That&#8217;s potentiall disastrous &#8212; they&#8217;d need to repurchase all the trendy wine bars and refill them with all the staff they&#8217;ve been downsizing. Serious money, whereas phishing losses are still down in the noise.</p>
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		<title>By: Andy Steingruebl</title>
		<link>http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2010/01/25/how-hard-can-it-be-to-measure-phishing/comment-page-1/#comment-46040</link>
		<dc:creator>Andy Steingruebl</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 25 Jan 2010 23:10:22 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/?p=1607#comment-46040</guid>
		<description>Great post and paper Richard.  I&#039;m curious why you think that measuring phishing activity, regardless of how measured, tells you anything.

What is that number useful for, and what does it help you drive? It tells us a little about the total volume of these scams reaching end-users, but doesn&#039;t really tell us anything about how much we should spend stopping it, what the total economic damage it, etc.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Great post and paper Richard.  I&#8217;m curious why you think that measuring phishing activity, regardless of how measured, tells you anything.</p>
<p>What is that number useful for, and what does it help you drive? It tells us a little about the total volume of these scams reaching end-users, but doesn&#8217;t really tell us anything about how much we should spend stopping it, what the total economic damage it, etc.</p>
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